Introduction
The opening quotations, cited from two well-known List scholars, are illustrative of the widespread view that Friedrich List's concept of "national economic development", originally devised in mid 19th century for Germany, the United States and a few other "developing" economies of that period, is also relevant for underdeveloped countries of the 20th century and later. These correspond approximately to what List used to call "tropical", "torrid" or "hot" zone, as in the passage reproduced above. Differently from the description -by Henderson, Salin and other historians of thought -of List as a champion of the Third World, the German-American economist often pointed out that his discussion of economic development policy (particularly the famous "infant industry" argument) applied only to a relatively small group of nations, which, among other features, belonged to the temperate climate zone. List's sense of "tropical" and "temperate" areas was not exact, as shown by his treatment of the whole South American continent (including Chile, Uruguay, Argentina and the south of Brazil) as a tropical zone. List's division of the world economy into two broad set of nations is better rendered by the distinction between the industrialized/industrializing "North" (or "centre") and the primary commodities exporters of the "South" (or "periphery").
The goal of the present paper is twofold. It examines how List's interpretation of the economic dynamics of "tropical" countries fits in his overall analytical framework and accords with his emphasis on the explanatory value of environmental factors and on the role of colonialism in the development of the "temperate" nations. List's thoughts in that regard are compared to some of his contemporaries'. This is followed by a selective investigation of the reception of List's ideas in some Latin American countries (particularly Brazil) between late 19th and mid 20th centuries, as an attempt to establish whether List's readers in those countries took any notice of List' s point that such economies should not embark on an industrialization process. The appendix discusses List's deep interest in setting up a commercial treaty between Germany and Brazil in the 1840s, which did not materialize. Of course, List's distinction between the growth patterns of tropical and temperate countries has not escaped the attention of commentators. Nevertheless, his remarks have been often seen as an "odd" reflection of his "prejudice" (Senghaas 1989, p. 65) or "not clear" at all (Shafaeddin 2005, p. 51 ). An important exception is Monique Anson-Meyer's (1982, pp. 104-15 ) monograph on List as a "development economist in the 19th century", which, however, does not deal with the issue of the absorption of List's concepts in "tropical" countries.
Sure enough, regardless of List's explicit caveats, his theory and policy of economic development were generalized and applied to countries such as India, where he was, "surprisingly" enough, celebrated as the "patron-saint of a nationalist path to industrialization and economic development", as pointed out by Andrea Maneschi (1998, pp. 92, 97) . In the same vein, Leonard Gomes (2003, p. 81) observed that "those who see List as a champion of industrialization in underdeveloped countries forget that he saw no future for many of these countries along that road". While List's claim -that national political and economic development is an exclusive attribute of the nations of the "temperate zone" -was largely overlooked or rejected in underdeveloped countries, List became the "favorite theorist of those 'torrid zone' nations about whose future he had so little to say", similarly to Marx's great success in Russia (Szporluk 1988, p. 151) . However, whereas List's influence in India is relatively well documented in the literature (see Arndt 1987, p. 18; Dasgupta 1993, pp. 119-20; Szporluk, pp. 203-04 and references there cited), his impact in Latin America and underdeveloped areas in general is harder to assess (see Henderson 1983, p. 217; Waterbury 1999, p. 328) . 1 List's key influence in the spread of economic nationalism in Chile at the end of the 19th century has been discussed by Aníbal Pinto (1968, p. 133) and Joseph Love (1996a, p. 210 ).
Love's suggestion that List had little influence elsewhere on the continent around that period is not warranted, though, as shown below. After the Second War, Latin American development thinking and (to some extent) policy became dominated by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL, in Spanish and Portuguese), led by Celso Furtado and especially Raul Prebisch, born in Brazil and Argentina respectively. Development policy was based on import-substituting industrialization, which has been often interpreted as an application of the infant-industry argument (see e.g. Ray 1998, ch. 17) . However, List was seldom mentioned by CEPAL economists at the time; hence, his influence on import substitution theory and policy remains an open issue, which is also tackled here.
The reception of List in underdeveloped countries should be seen as an instance of the process of international transmission of economic ideas studied by Joseph Spengler (1970) and others. Moreover, the absorption, appropriation or rejection of List's texts and ideas by different "interpretive communities" (Fish 1980, pp. 14-16; Weintraub 1991, ch. 1) , such as historians of thought, trade theorists, political scientists, development economists and policy-makers, indicate that, like J.M. Keynes and other influential economists (see Weintraub 1994) , List was (is) alive in different contexts, times and places.
Trade, climate and national economic development
Friedrich List (b.1789; d.1846 ) is not usually regarded by historians of thought as a keen economic theoretician (see e.g. Schumpeter 1954, pp. 504-05; Tribe 1988, p. 19) , but this has not prevented him from being the most widely read German economist after Marx. His main contributions are contained in the 1841 volume Das nationale System der Politischen Oekonomie (translated into English in 1856 in the United States and in 1885 in England), which, as indicated by its title, focused on the "national" -which was his sense of "political" -dimension of economic thought and policy. List's System may be regarded as the foremost expression of "economic nationalism" in the 19 th century (see Hont 2005, pp. 148, 154 Although highly successful as part of the tradition of the "American system" of national political economy (see e.g. Dorfman 1966, ch. 22; Spiegel 1987) , the Outlines would become well-known outside the United States only after its reproduction by Margaret Hirst (1909) . Hence, although it is important to refer to those three books in order to trace the evolution of his ideas, List's international influence is based primarily on the National System. The 1885 translation is the most used one, but it lacks List's 1841 introduction -a summing up of the main points of the book -which was translated in Hirst 1909.
List's argument was organized around an extended criticism of the economics of Adam Smith, J.B. Say and other classical economists that formed what he called the "school" of "cosmopolitical economy", which he contrasted with his own "political economy" based on the role of the nation (see List [1841] 1885, ch. 11). As maintained by Keith Tribe (1988; 1995, ch. 3), in order to understand the reasons behind the popularity and influence of List's critique of the classics, it is necessary to reconstruct his economic discourse and the variety of conditions that may account for its relative success. It was his exposure to American economic growth and the related debate on protectionism and industrialization (started by Alexander Hamilton at the end of the 18th century and continued by Daniel Raymond in the 1820s) that led List to understand economic development as the result of the working of economic forces on an international scale divided into heterogeneous national entities (Tribe 1988, pp. 29-30; 1995, pp. 44-55 ; see also Schumpeter p. 505 on List's "Americanization"). The main concern of List's political economy of nationalism was power, not just welfare, as pointed out by Edward Earle (1944, p. 142) . The cosmopolitical economists' priority of the markets over the states, and its reduction of politics to a sum of individual actions, had lost sight of the interconnection between trade and national politics (Hont, 2005, p. 150) . This was made clear in the Outlines:
The idea of national economy arises with the idea of nations. A nation is the medium between individuals and mankind, a separate society of individuals, who ... constitute one body, free and independent, following only the dictates of its interests, as regards other independent bodies, and possessing power to regulate the interest of the individuals constituting that body, in order to create the greatest quantity of common welfare in the interior and the greatest quantity of security in regards other nations. The object of the economy of this body is not only wealth, but power and wealth, because national wealth is increased and secured by national power, as national power is increased and secured by national wealth. Its leading principles are therefore not only economical, but political too (List [1827] 1909, p. 162).
List's understanding of national economy and its political and economic growth were based on the concept of a nation's "productive power" -which may be regarded his main theoretical achievement (Szporluk 1988, p. 140; Levi-Faur 1997) -as opposed to the emphasis on material "exchange values" he ascribed to the "school" of Smith and Say (and to the Physiocrats before them). Aggregate wealth (that is, the sum of national assets) grows not in proportion with the stock of material capital accumulated by a nation, but as a function of the development of its "productive powers", formed by three different kinds of capital: "capital of nature", "capital of mind" and "capital of productive matter" (List [1827 . The productivity of the latter depends upon the two former, that is upon the fertility of nature and especially upon "the intelligence and social conditions of a nation", which comprises advances in science and technology, legal-institutional framework, educational system, transport and communication network, etc. Powers of production are, therefore, the means whereby wealth can be increased in the future (List [1841] 1885, p. 108), a concept which arose from the criticism of the classical notions of "productive labour" and its division. Productivity depends not only on the division of labour per se, but on the union of efforts to a common end. Accordingly, in List's perspective Smith missed the interdependence dimension of the division of social labour and the interaction between different economic sectors (see Tribe 1988, p. 34) . Hence, as observed by Marcello de Cecco (1974, p. 9) , whereas the primum mobile of the economy in Smith is the attempt to maximize the individual's welfare, in List the primum mobile is represented by "man's desire to congregate in extra-familiar units".
However industrious, thrifty, enterprising, moral and intelligent the individuals may be, without national unity, national division of labour, and national co-operation of productive powers the nation will never reach a high level of prosperity and power ... The principle of division of labour has not been fully grasped up to the present. Productivity depends not only on the division of various manufacturing operations among many individuals, but still more on the moral and physical co-operation of these individuals to a common end ... Division of labour and co-operation of productive powers exist where the intellectual activity of the nation bears a proper ratio to its material production, where agriculture, industry and trade are equally and harmoniously developed (List [1841] 1909, pp. 306-07).
List's "productive powers" are culturally grounded and nationally bounded, as pointed out by David Levi-Faur (1997, p. 165) . The economic role of the state is to protect and enlarge the national productive powers mainly through industrial development, since manufacturing is perceived as closely associated with technical progress, art, improved infrastructure, political freedom, urbanization and methods of warfare (List [1841 (List [ ] 1885 . The development of national productive powers takes place historically through a sequence of growth stages: (a) the savage stage, (b) the pastoral stage, (c) the agricultural stage, (d) the agricultural and manufacturing stage, and (e) the agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial stage (List [1841 [1841] 1885, p. 143). List's stages theory was first elaborated and discussed in detail in his Natural System (List [1837 (List [ ] 1983 . It was part of an old and broad tradition that had informed the interpretation of social progress since the Greeks through the 18th century philosophy of enlightenment (see Hoselitz 1960, pp. 195-203 ). List's stages are not only a scheme to study the development of national economies through time, but also an instrument of comparison between nations at any given time (see Szporluk 1988, p. 134) . The crux of List's growth theory, as pointed out by , is the passage from stage (c) to (d) , that is, the transformation of a mature agricultural state into one with higher productive powers by the introduction of industries. Such process depends on whether the industrializing nations are at the same level of development -in which case it can be accomplished by free trade -or some nations have outdistanced others in manufactures, which makes it necessary the adoption of a protective tariff system by less advanced nations in order to be able to compete in the international economy (List [1841 . Hence, economic development policy was perceived as stage-specific.
List's discussion of the protection of infant industries (a term he did not use) 2 should be seen in the context of his stages theory of the development of national productive powers. He suggested a corresponding succession of four periods relating economic growth and international trade (List [1841 . Initially, home agriculture is promoted by exporting part of its output and importing manufactures. This is followed by import-substitution until domestic manufacturing dominates the home-market. Finally, the nation becomes a large exporter of industrial goods and importer of raw materials and agricultural products. It was only in the second and third periods that protective tariffs should be introduced in order to foster "national industrial education" (ibid; italics in the original), meaning the development of productive powers.
The notion of "industrial education" was the focus of List's ([1839] 1928) French article on "Political economy before the court of history", where he sustained that, since economics (like medicine) was based on observation and experience, one should found economic propositions on the study of history. The article is a powerful anticipation of the main arguments and method of the 1841 book, particularly the historical approach that made List a precursor of the German Historical School. History, claimed List ([1839 List ([ ] 1928 [1841] 1885, ch. 10), provided evidence that protectionism was a general feature of the industrialization of all nations, including England, the first industrial power. In a phrase that would become famous, List ([1841] 1885, p. 295) charged that, under the inspiration of Smith's "school", British administrations had proclaimed that other countries should follow the principles of free trade and, by that, "kicked away the ladder" by which Great Britain had climbed up.
The infant industry argument had been advanced before List by, among others, Hamilton and John Rae, and would be further elaborated a few years after the National System by J.S. Mill, through whose Principles it penetrated orthodox economics (see Maneschi 1998, ch. 5; Irwin 1996, ch. 8 And we have explained why it takes such a long time for a factory to reach its full potential and maximum efficiency (List [1837 (List [ ] 1983 Marshall would later call "increasing returns". It is common knowledge, writes List, that "the cost of production in manufacturing business depends a great deal on the quantity that is manufactured". After an example illustrating how average costs fall with the increase in production and sales, List concludes that this circumstance has a "mighty influence in the rise and fall of manufacturing power", as determined by the assurance of a "large supply of the home market". 3 The argument is summed up in one of the final chapters of the National System.
Historical experience has shown that
All individual branches of industry have the closest reciprocal effect on one another; that the perfecting of one branch prepares and promotes the perfecting of all others; that no one of them can be neglected without the effects of that neglect being felt by all; that, in short, the whole manufacturing power of a nation constitutes an inseparable whole (List [1841] 1885, pp. 310-11).
List's stress on external economies and complementarities between firms and sectors -and the difficulties they pose to starting the development process -resurfaced in the economic literature of the 1940s and 1950s on underdevelopment as a coordination failure, represented mainly by Paul Rosestein-Rodan and Ragnar Nurkse (see Hoselitz 1960, p. 202, n.) . 4 List's argument about the dynamic welfare repercussions of trade tariffs may be expressed in terms of the learning by doing, spillover and increasing return effects that comprise the modern approach to infant industry protection (see e.g. Ray 1998, pp. 669-73; Shafaeddin 2005, pp. 49-50) . Protection was only justified for countries which had progressed beyond the initial growth stages, achieved a mature agricultural state and a certain development of productive powers, and had a large area and population. The economic improvement of nations in their early stages, with a "low level of intelligence and culture", is best accomplished "through free trade with highly cultivated, rich and industrious nations" and any attempt to plant industries in those countries through tariff protection was deemed "premature and injurious" (List [1841] 1909, p. 312).
At first, List ([1837] 1983) argued that, in principle, (most) underdeveloped nations would eventually reach a stage of growth at which the adoption of protectionist tariffs and their industrialization was warranted. That was the basis for List's ([1837 List's ([ ] 1983 claim that, since "most countries are potentially capable of establishing and developing all kinds of industries" and, moreover, "agriculture is dependent upon natural processes that man can do little to modify", international trade tends to be largely dominated by agricultural goods produced in different climates and soil. Classical economists, by failing to distinguish between agriculture and manufacturing, had not appreciated correctly the influence of climate and nature on the international division of labour and the production of wealth (see also List [1841] 1885, p. 131).
They proclaim that nature utterly rejects restrictions on commerce because she has endowed different peoples with different resources and the ability to produce different products ... This argument is all very fine but we have shown that it applies only to agricultural products. As far as the output of manufactured goods is concerned it is obvious that the major states of the temperate zone ... are all equally capable of establishing great industries (List [1837 (List [ ] 1983 see also [1841] 1885, p. 172).
That was List's first brief reference to the "temperate zone". Whereas in the Natural System the theory of growth stages -and the infant industry argument associated with it -was generally applied to all countries, List would turn the 1837 passing mention to temperate countries (and implicitly to tropical ones) into one of the backbones of his approach to trade and growth in the National System. Nature, he would argue, also plays a role in manufacturing activity, but of another sort. Differently from his earlier books, List now divided the world economy into two broad geographical areas: the industrialized (or industrializing) temperate zone and the agricultural tropical zone (see also Tribe 1987, p. 218; Coustillac 2009, p. 221 ).
Such division was based, according to List, on the effects of climate on the supply of physical and mental effort.
Countries with a temperate climate are (almost without exception) adapted for factories and manufacturing industry. The moderate temperature of the air promotes the development and exertion of power far more than a hot temperature (List [1841] 1885, p.
172).
Nature lays down certain conditions for the existence of agriculture and manufactures, but these conditions are not always the same. As far as natural resources are concerned the lands of the temperate zone are peculiarly fitted for the development of a manufacturing power, since a temperate climate is the natural home of physical and mental effort (List [1841 .
While List may be criticized for resorting to a very "rudimentary" form of the theory of climates as a convenient way to justify his colonialism (Anson-Meyer 1982, pp. 110-112; Coustillac 2009, p. 221) , it should be noted that his argument about the influence of climate and nature on national characters fits well with the "environmentalism" thought, regarded by Schumpeter (1954, p. 434) as one of the main ingredients of the Zeitgeist of the period. It was an important element of Marx's (see Cowen and Shenton 1996, pp. 145 and 164) and especially J.S.
Mill's explanation of the observation that economic progress is often less intense in tropical areas with plenty of natural resources, which has become known in the literature as the "banana parable" after Alexander von Humboldt's reports on the perverse effects of the fertility of tropical land on effort supply in New Spain (Mexico) at the beginning of the 19th century (see Boianovsky 2013) . Although its origins may be traced to Hellenic medical and political thinkers, it was only after Montesquieu's L'Espirit des Lois that it became influential (Glacken 1967, ch. 12). List had been, since young age, a keen reader of Montesquieu (Coustillac 2009, p. 203) .
Environmentalism is also present in List's rendition of the so-called "no pain no gain" argument.
The severe season of the year, which appears to the superficial observer as an unfavorable effect of nature, is the most powerful promoter of habits of energetic activity, of forethought, order, and economy ... A man [under these circumstances] must necessarily become far more industrious and economical than the one who merely requires protection from the rain, and into whose mouth the fruits are ready to drop during the whole year. Diligence, economy, order, and forethought are at first produced by necessity, afterwards by habit, and by the steady cultivation of those virtues (List [1841] 1885, p. 172). Tribe 1988, pp. 33-35) . Although the tropical zone could benefit from such process, its pace of economic development would be probably lower than growth in industrialized countries, as discussed next.
Civilization, markets and colonies
As mentioned above, List did not initially restrict his growth stages theory to countries of the temperate zone. Indeed, after a critical comment on the adoption of protectionist policies in South America (which will be further discussed below), List [1837] 1983, p. 44) maintained that if the government of a backward nation encouraged imports of "cheap manufactured goods" from abroad and the exports of raw materials and agricultural goods, it would "gradually stimulate the demand at home for a greater diversity of manufactured goods". This would stimulate people to increase their output of primary commodities so as to be able to purchase foreign industrial goods, which would be accompanied by larger effort supply, savings and educational facilities. In this way, according to List, "a backward nation can develop into a progressive state". In the same vein, List ([1827 ; see also p. 165) stated in his
Outlines that "Mexico and the Southern Republics" (that is, South America) would make a mistake if they restricted free trade. Their people, "being yet uninstructed, indolent, and not accustomed to many enjoyments, must first be led by a desire of enjoyment to laborious habits, But, long before that, Great Britain should, as the mid 19th century dominant power, use
her influence "in all the barbarous and half-civilized countries of Central and South America, of Asia and Africa" in order to bring about changes associated with the "civilizing process" -such as introduction of security of persons and property, construction of transportation system, promotion of education and morality, and elimination of superstition and idleness. These "operations of civilization" -necessary as they were for increasing the production of tropical goods -would be more successful to the extent that Great Britain gave up her policy of monopolistic control of tropical markets through commercial privileges -such as the commercial treaty established with Brazil after its independence (see the appendix below) -and opened those markets to the Continental nations and the US (List [1841] German manufactured goods and assist those areas in rising to a "higher grade of civilization".
Since those countries "will never make great progress in manufacturing industry", the industrial nation that set up firm commercial relations with Latin America "may remain in possession ... for all future time ... of [this] new and rich market for manufactured goods" (List [1841] 1885, p.
346). The other area suggested by List (p. 347) for German colonization effort through the expansion of the Zollverein was South-Eastern Europe, which would provide food and raw materials to industrialized Germany (Henderson 1983, pp. 104-07) . List originated the ideology of German economic colonialism as an important element of the economic development of the country (Smith 1974, pp. 644-45 ; see also Semmel 1993, pp. 67-68) . Such program for overseas and continental expansion would probably entail the risk of war, as List was aware (see also Earle 1944, pp. 144-45) .
The essentially asymmetric character of the international economy was often stressed by
List. The development of the productive powers of nations of the temperate zone enabled them to make the countries of "tropical climates and of inferior civilization" tributary to themselves and, by that, use the international division of labour for "their own enrichment" (List [1841] 1885, p.
131). Such asymmetry was perceived as a permanent, not transitory, feature. The tropical zone included not just the incipient Latin American republics but also old civilizations like India and other Asian nations, whose culture was "retrograding".
This exchange between the countries of the temperate zone and the countries of the torrid zone is based upon natural causes, and will be so for all time. Hence India has given up her manufacturing power with her independency to England; hence all Asiatic countries of the torrid zone will pass gradually under the domination of the manufacturing commercial nations of the temperate zone ... and the States of South America will always remain dependent to a certain degree on the manufacturing commercial nations (List [1841 (List [ ] 1885 .
This contradicts List's remarks made in the introduction to the National System (quoted in section 2 above) that tropical countries would not be dependent if only industrialization spread over the whole temperate zone. As far as India was concerned, List acknowledged her lost of manufacturing power to England, but claimed that she gained even more by expanding her output of agricultural goods for the domestic and foreign markets. In any event, the "destruction" (Semmel 1970, pp. 209-10; Szporluk 1988, p. 127; Arndt 1987, p. 36 ). In the same vein, F. Engels celebrated the conquest of Texas by the United States at the expenses of Mexico, as List had already done.
The "imperialist" view was closely associated with the notion that trusteeship was a necessary ingredient of economic development, in the sense that underdeveloped societies should be guided by those societies where the conditions of development were already present.
Trusteeship has been identified by Cowen and Shenton (1996, ch. 1) as the defining element of 19 th century doctrine of development. It could be also found in the influence of the experience of 19 th century imperialism on J.S. Mill's political and economic thought on development in "barbaric" and "civilized" nations (Jahn 2005) . Indeed, as documented by Arndt (1978, p. 24) , that notion of development goes back to la mission civilisatrice of colonialism in the days of 
Aspects of List's reception in Latin America

Economic nationalism and tariffs (1870s-1920s)
During the period between the last quarter of the 19th and the first quarter of the 20th centuries exports of primary commodities from Latin America to the temperate countries of Europe and
North America expanded as part of international economic growth. Although it is true that Latin
American economies (especially Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Chile and Mexico) benefited from industrial development in Europe and the US, Arndt's (1987, p. 21) inference -that the region was an exception to the role of nationalism as the catalyst of modernization that had taken place in Japan, China, India and other underdeveloped countries in late 19th and early 20th centuriesdoes not necessarily follow.
Henryk Szlajfer (1990) (Luz, ch. 3) , but the first signs of change could already be seen in 1844, when the commercial treaty with Great Britain -which had been denounced by List a couple of years earlier, as mentioned in section 3 and discussed further in the appendix -expired and was not renewed. In that same year, a new customs tariff was published, raising import duties from 15% to 30-60% ad valorem (Luz 1961, pp. 24-25) .
Further protectionist changes in the tariff system in 1879, together with balance of payments problems caused by the cyclical fall in economic activity in industrial countries in the late 1870s
and early 1880s, helped to form a favourable environment for the creation of the Industrial Association. It was in that context that Antonio Felicio dos Santos, president of that association, mentioned in 1881 "the great economist List" in a document demanding a broader protectionist legislation (Carone 1977, p. 151 is why it could not be considered a "normal nation".
We are, indeed, a free and politically independent people, but in the realm of economic interests, we are, still today, a colony ... Societies which are not economically independent can never constitute the kind of great nation that List, the initiator of the Zollverein, described when he wrote that an independent and well organized nation must posses -together with a common language, literature, large territory and numerous population -agriculture, manufacturing industry, commerce and navigation harmonically developed, while the arts, sciences and the means of culture and education rise themselves on equal footing with material production (Correia [1903] 1980, p.19; my translation).
Elsewhere in the book, claimed that history had shown that "reasonable protection" was necessary in order to develop the "productive powers of new countries" through "educative" tariffs that prevent the annihilation of domestic "infant production" by competition from old industrial nations. Correia and Cavalcanti referred also to other protectionist authors, like the Frenchman Paul L. Cauwès (1881), who illustrates the presence of Listian ideas in France (see Schumpeter 1954, p. 853) . In fact, List's exposure to French protectionist ideas (especially Jean Antoine Chaptal's), even before coming to America, had helped convert him to protectionism (Henderson 1989 Chile "lacked all the conditions demanded by industrial life", such as advanced agriculture and economic capacity of workers for industrial activities. Encina developed the thesis that, instead of protectionism, Chile's economic growth needed changes in the education system and economic policy in general. This was not far from List's own advice to South American countries, but Encina did not seem to realize that. Bunge studied engineering in Germany between 1900 and 1905, where he was exposed to List's ideas and to the Zollverein experience. In an address delivered at the University of Chicago in 1922, Bunge (1930, pp. 105-06) argued that, although Argentina should keep increasing its agricultural and cattle production, it would be highly detrimental to its economy if such increase was not accompanied by an equivalent development of manufacturing industries. List's insights on the "normal nation" and the division of the world economy in great economic blocks are visible in Bunge's 1922 American lecture. Bunge (1930, p. 88 ) sustained that only "great nations" could play a meaningful role in international economy and politics. One of the objectives of the common market of the south cone was to challenge the United States's hegemony in South America. "Great nations" should feature a large territory with abundance of fertile land and mineral resources, "white race", and nutrition based on beef and wheat.
Countries with large natural assets but populated by a "mediocre ethnic type" fed on tropical vegetables were beset by an "organic disequilibrium between man and the physical environment" and therefore were unfit for industrialization.
It is implicit in Bunge's argument that purely tropical countries were economically inferior, a notion that, unlike List's (see Szporluk 1988, p. 128) , seemed to be partly based on racial discrimination. Of course, the proposed economic union contained "subtropical" areas in Argentine territory and a "torrid zone" corresponding to Paraguay and Bolivia, whose agricultural and mineral production was "valuable", as Bunge stated in an article published in
Revista de Economia Argentina in 1929, titled "A great economic union: the customs union of the south", reprinted in his collection of essays (Bunge 1930, pp.47, 49) . Apparently, Bunge would apply to those countries his remark that "inside our political borders we posses our own colonial dominions, something similar to the African subtropical colonies" (Bunge 1928a, p. 226; article published originally in the newspaper La Nación in 1927). Another interesting parallel between Bunge and List is that they shared the view that national economic development was closely related to the expansion of the transportation network, especially in the form of the railway system, as Bunge (1928b, ch. 10 ) set out to show statistically for the Argentine economy (on List as the "railway pioneer" see Henderson 1983, ch. 3; Tribe 1995, pp. 62-65) . During the early 1920s the young Raúl Prebisch (b. 1901; d. 1986 ) -who after the Second Great War would become secretary-executive of CEPAL and Latin America's leading development economistinteracted with Bunge as his student and research assistant. Prebisch was "intrigued" by Bunge's campaign for the Southern Cone economic integration, but remained unimpressed at the time by the argument for protectionism instead of free trade (Dosman 2008, pp. 30-31) .
CEPAL, infant industry and import substitution (1930s-1950s)
With the intense fall of external demand and prices of exported goods during the Great Depression of the 1930s, the change in relative prices spurred an increase in the demand for domestically produced manufactured goods, which marked the start of the second phase of the industrialization process in Latin American countries, known as import-substituting industrialization, or ISI (see Furtado [1969 Furtado [ ] 1970 . Although List's national economy continued to be a background influence, references to his texts fell in comparison with the preceding period. This can be in part explained by the publication of Mihail book on the theory of protection and international trade, which was soon translated into Portuguese The infant-industry argument was gradually interpreted and absorbed by neoclassical trade economists as minor deviations from the static optimum, whereas the "Manoilescu's type of argument" for protection was further elaborated by development economists, as surveyed by Hla Myint (1963) at the 1961 meetings of the International Economic Association on trade theory and development. Eugenio Gudin, the leading Brazilian orthodox economist at the time, stated at the debates which followed Myint's presentation that protection was beneficial for underdeveloped areas because they needed time to build up external economies. He objected, however, that "infants were so slow in growing", and complained that in fact List's recommendation that tariffs should be set around 25% and last for no more than 30 years had often been ignored. 11 In Gudin's (1963, p. 464) view, developing countries needed both "the carrot and the stick", the latter consisting of a gradual reduction in the rate of protection. He rejected the Manoilescu's type of argument, on the grounds that disguised unemployment was not a general feature of Latin American countries. In his polemic with Roberto Simonsen about the role of economic planning, Gudin ([1945] 1977, p. 107) had already mentioned, against
Simonsen, List's point that protection should be "moderate and temporary". Manoilescu's type of argument was deployed. According to Prebisch (see CEPAL 1954, pp. 60-62) , protection is justified because of differences of productivity between developed industrialized countries and underdeveloped agricultural ones, caused by disparities in the capital-labour ratio and technology. It is conceivable that a decrease in the wage levels of underdeveloped countries could offset such differences. However, apart from the practical issues involved, such wage fall would cause a drop in export prices through the working of the wageprice mechanism. For given import prices, this would bring about a "deterioration of the terms of trade" -Prebisch's favourite thesis -with perverse effects on economic growth. The upshot is that protection is necessary to offset the differences in productivity. In contrast with the infantindustry tenet, protection should not be restricted to incipient industrialization, but continue so long as productivity remained lower than in industrialized countries and to the extent that such differential were not compensated by wage differences.
Within the classical school of economic thought, protective measures are condoned during the initial phase of industrialization until such time as industry can be strengthened and has ability to meet foreign competition. It is certainly possible that, in a developing country, a given industry may achieve the same capital density and the same productivity as in the large industrial countries. In such a case, in view of lower wages, it would cease to be an infant industry requiring protection, even before reaching the same degree of productivity. But this could hardly be the case for all the industries which a developing country requires, to expand, as a means of absorbing the actively employed population not required by other sectors. For this purpose it would be necessary to obtain a volume of capital per person similar to that of highly developed countries ...
[which] is hardly likely to occur ... As a result, the argument employed here to demonstrate the inevitability of protection enlarges the scope of the classical argument (CEPAL 1954, p. 61).
Such arguments, further elaborated by Prebisch (1959) , indicate that CEPAL's case for import-substituting industrialization was not based on the infant-industry concept (see also Rodríguez 1981, p. 160; Bielschowsky 1988, p. 14) . Juan Noyola ([1956] 1996, p. 312) , an economist of the CEPAL team, noticed that "to List's traditional arguments" for industrialization it is now added the "more powerful" one "outlined by 329). The two economists also shared the notion that the world economy was divided into a developed industrial centre and an underdeveloped periphery, which is discussed further below.
Celso Furtado was another CEPAL economist who, as director of its economic development department between 1950 and 1957, contributed to the formation of development economics in Latin America (see Boianovsky 2010) . As recollected by Furtado in his autobiography and elsewhere, discussions about the notions of "social productivity" and appropriate technology and their application to economic planning at CEPAL in the early 1950s led him to revisit at the time List's concept of a system of productive powers (Furtado 1985, p. 133 ). According to Furtado (1980, p. 211 ), List's idea, by highlighting the interdependence and complementarity of productive activities, provided the first step towards formulating a theory of production regarded as a social process, not as an aggregate of isolated entities (see also Dantas 1997) . "In this way external economies, which are of considerable importance in the study of development, can be included in the theory of production. Thus the inadequacy of microeconomic criteria of rationality for defining a model of social productivity becomes obvious" (ibid; italics in the original).
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Furtado was also influenced by List's application of the notion of productive powers to the study of the relation between trade and growth, as described in his 1987 World Bank lecture:
The view of productivity as a holistic social phenomenon brought me back to the concept of the system of productive forces introduced by Friedrich List a century earlier.
Productive activities could be seen as an articulated whole. Understanding of this whole had to precede that of its parts. This approach shed new light on the nature of external relations, whose role was that of "dynamic center" or force behind the changes on which the development of these economies was based during the primary-export phase.
Indeed, Furtado investigated in his books and essays on economic history how the Brazilian and other Latin American economies had gone through a succession of phases (or stages) and, in particular, the role played by the exports of primary commodities in the transition to industrialization in those countries (see Boianovsky 2010, sections 1 and 2). Despite the absence of references to List by Furtado -who was probably exposed to his ideas during doctoral studies at the Sorbonne in the late 1940s -this could be seen as a generalization of some aspects of List's stages model to tropical countries, unlike List's own perspective.
As a result of the translation of List (1841) 
Discussion
As documented above, List's distinction between "temperate" and "tropical" zones (which from his perspective included Latin America as a whole), and his restrictions concerning the industrialization of the latter, were largely ignored by economists who were influenced by his ideas in Latin America. The few exceptions, represented by academic studies about List's work that started to appear in the 1940s and 1950s (apart from Sánchez Sarto 1941 and Ravell 1956 , see also Teichert 1958 1987, p. 18; Dasgupta 1993, pp. 119-20) .
It is possible that economists from underdeveloped countries tended to disregard List's argument about the fate of tropical countries because it was not part of the "central message" he wanted to convey. As suggested by Don Patinkin (1982, p. 17) , historians of thought should try to pass a regression line through a scholar's work that will represent its "central message". Is
List's argument about the inaptitude of tropical nations for industrialization part of that regression line, or just a noise? As discussed and documented in sections 2 and 3 above, the distinction between the economic dynamics of temperate and tropical countries was considered by List important enough to be included in his 1841 introduction, which summed up the main results of the book. Sure enough, he did not write a separate chapter about that, but spread his remarks along the whole book.
Some commentators have picked up such remarks and observed their relevance for List's framework. That was the case of the famous critical review written anonymously by John Austin in the Edinburgh Review just after the publication of the book (on Austin's authorship see Morison 1982, p. 28) . As pointed out by Austin (1842, pp. 528-31) , the division of the world into two zones was a key feature of List's trade theory and policy. The same is true of Margaret Hirst (1909) and more recent historians referred to above. It was mentioned by Charles Gide and Charles Rist ([1900] 1947, p. 305) in their well-known chapter about List, without any elaboration though. However, despite its relevance, the concept of "central message" is problematic because it assumes that the message thus derived can be measured up against its reception. In particular, it tends to overlook that readers can diverge from what the author tried to convey by using the author's argument for their own purposes, and old issue in the hermeneutics literature (see e.g. Hirsch 1967; Skinner 1988 List's suggestion that "tropical" countries would benefit from industrialization in the "temperate" regions has been largely confirmed in the 19 th century historical experience -when terms of trade moved favourably to primary commodities -even if accompanied by divergence in economic growth rates (see Williamson 2011) , which is also compatible with his framework. As argued by Williamson (ibid, chapter 10) , the real drag on the economic development of Third
World countries, as far as trade is concerned, has been export price volatility instead of the longrun trend of terms of trade against manufactured goods. Interestingly enough, List had claimed that countries that specialize in exports of primary commodities suffered from oscillations in price and quantities associated with the "fickleness of foreign demand", which posed a serious problem for such economies, whose private and public levels of expenditure were usually adjusted to previous periods of peak of exports.
Agricultural prosperity would under these circumstances act like the stimulant of opium or strong drink, stimulating merely for a moment, but weakening for a whole lifetime... A period of temporary and passing prosperity in agriculture is a far greater misfortune than uniform and lasting poverty. If prosperity is to bring real benefit to individuals and nations, it must be continuous... And only by the possession of manufacturing power of their own, can well-developed nations posses any guarantee for the steady and permanent increase... (List [1841 (List [ ] 1885 .
The selective reading of List by the interpretive communities formed by South American economists from the end of the 19th to mid 20th centuries probably reflects the fact that they got from him what they were looking for, regardless of the accuracy of that reading. By doing so, they applied to their own countries ideas that had been originally designed for Germany or the United States. In his methodological study about the international transmission of economic ideas, Spengler (1970, p. 144 ) mentioned the reception of List's nationalist ideas in India as an example of the importance of content in explaining the degree of success of the transmission process. List's overall success in developing countries (despite partial exceptions such as
Manoilescu, who however paid his respects to List in the process) may be also explained by his key contribution to the change in the role of economists as active players in the formulation of economic development policies (see Boetke and Horwitz 2005, pp. 22-23) .
Indeed, as observed by Jacob Viner (1953, p. 12) in his Brazilian lectures, the emerging field of development economics, with its challenge to classical trade theory, was "quite 'Listian' in character, even when not directly derived from List". In the same vein, Harry Johnson (1967, pp. 131-32) 2. The term "infant industry" and the argument associated with it go back to the 17th and 18th centuries (see Viner 1937, pp. 71-72; Irwin 1996, pp. 116-18 5. In the 1856 translation it is written "this competition [between temperate countries] will not only assure a full supply of manufactures at low prices..." (List [1841] 1856, p. 76). However, the expression "low prices" is not in the German original.
6. James Mill (1809, pp. 279, 280) had already called attention, from the perspective of Great Britain, to the "brilliant prospects which seem to be opened up for our species in the New World" and that "every eye will ultimately rest on South America" after its emancipation.
7. List ([1841] 1885, p. 152) would also include Egypt in his short-list of countries that should not embrace the "foolish idea" of attempting, in their "present state of culture", to establish industry by means of protection. List's reference to Egypt suggests that he was not completely oblivious -if critical -to the early import-substitution experiment carried out by Mohamed Ali in that country in the first half of the 19 th century, contrary to Waterbury's (1999, p. 325) remark. On Egypt's failed attempt to industrialize at the time, see Williamson (2011, pp. 66-68) and references there cited. 8. Although influenced by List, Carey did not share the former's view about the benefits -to all parties involved -from the division of the word economy into two broad economic zones (see Semmel 1993 , chapter 4).
9. "The foreign trade of a nation must not be estimated in the way in which individual merchants judge it, solely and only according to the theory of values ... the nation is bound to keep steadily in view all these conditions on which its present and future existence, prosperity and power depend." And "it is true that protective duties at first increase the price of manufactured goods; but it is just as true ... that in the course of time ... those goods are produced more cheaply at home ... If, therefore, a sacrifice of value is caused by protective duties, it is made good by the gain of a power of production" (List [1841] 1885, pp. 117-17; italics in the original).
10. Subercaseaux was probably one of the very few Latin American economists read in Europe and the US at the time, thanks to his 1912 book about paper money, which was also translated into French (see ). 11. Cp. List ([1841 1885, p. 251): "It may in general be assumed that where any technical industry cannot be established by means of an original protection of forty to sixty per cent and cannot continue to maintain itself under a continued protection of twenty to thirty per cent the fundamental conditions of manufacturing power are lacking." 12. External economies as an important phenomenon at the level of the industrial sector as a whole (not just at the microeconomic level assumed e.g. by Gudin) were also stressed by development economist K. William Kapp ([1962] 1963) in his praise of List's relevance for India and other developing countries.
13. The Portuguese translation came out in Brazil in 1983 (List [1841 (List [ , 1885 (List [ ] 1983 ). It was, however, a second-hand translation made from the English version. In the introduction, Cristovam Buarque (1983, p. xxiv) suggested that List's colonialism and Eurocentrism were determined by his national German interests, and contradicted his theory of productive powers. had returned from Rio "empty-handed"; this would give Germany -which is "involved in Brazil's tariff question more than any other country" -the opportunity to step in. List expected that "after the press has reached the point of making Brazilians understand how they are mistreated by England", it should be possible to bring them to understand the benefits of direct trade with the states of the Zollverein, which have "no colonies of their own".
Appendix
The matter attracted the attention of another economic periodical launched also in 1843, but that would last much longer. The opening report in the very first issue of The Economist was about the expiring commercial treaty with Brazil. The English periodical pointed out that it was no surprise that the "Brazilians should have felt very strongly the unfavourable position" in which they were placed in their trade with Britain and should "have been exceedingly anxious to get rid of so partial a treaty as early as possible". The main demand of Brazilian negotiators, as informed by The Economist, was that their produce should be admitted into Britain at a duty not exceeding by more than 10 per cent that charged on British colonial produce (see also Manchester 1933, p. 294) . The Economist warned that in Germany "the hope of inducing the Brazilian government to conclude a treaty with them favourable to their [industrial] goods is daily becoming stronger". The report quoted to that effect an extract from a letter published in a Bremen newspaper, which sounded very much like List. The letter stated that German industrial power was restricted only by the lack of a suitable commercial policy. Almost all markets abroad, according to the letter, "are now supplied with the British manufactures in preponderating quantities and principally the Brazilian market, which is now almost exclusively in the possession of British industry, would be constrained to make a greater use of German manufactures, as soon as the United Germany had the courage to impose differential duties on the products of those countries … till they are convinced of the indispensability of the great German consuming markets, and see the necessity of making reciprocal concessions".
Trade agreements between a "highly civilized" temperate country and a tropical one with "low culture" would bring about important benefits for both parts involved, argued List ([1844a] 1931, p. 225). Since Germany did not posses any colonies at the time, she was in principle able to grant free tropical countries differential duties much lower than the tariffs charged by (Abrantes 1853, pp. 222-26) and was contrary to the principle of reciprocity. In his reply, Abrantes (ibid, pointed out that the fact that the Zollverein states had no colonies and formed an emerging industrial power had played a key role in the South-American country's effort to set up a trade agreement. At the same time, he stressed that differential duties were an "essential condition" for the agreement and denied that the recent increase in Brazilian tariffs made unfeasible the import of German goods. The negotiations then reached a dead end and the commercial treaty was not signed.
List followed closely the development of Abrantes's mission in Berlin. He was critical of the Zollverein's principle to exclude the differential tariffs system, which he defended enthusiastically in connection with the attempted trade treaty with Brazil (List [1844 . In September 30 1845 List wrote an article in the Zollvereinsblatt titled "The agreement with Brazil has failed", where he showed his disappointment at the fact that Abrantes was about to go back to Rio after the failure to reach an agreement which "for a while looked so close" (Salin et al 1931, p. 612) . In particular, List objected to von Rönne's argument that the differential tariffs system tended to bring about an (inefficient) allocation of economic activities according with the specific demands of each country involved. This was not true of the envisaged agreement, since the Zollverein potential exports to Brazil could be extended to any other countries of the torrid zone, and there was demand for Brazilian commodities in other European countries as well. It is not clear whether Abrantes was aware of List's support of the trade treaty with Brazil. This might had been the case, as indicated by Abrantes's (1853, vol. 2, 
